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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ZION'S PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
FORREST C. HOLT, VIRGINIA W. HOLT,
GORDON C. HOLT, individually, and
GORDON C. HOLT, dba HOLT REALTY &
INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.
TANDY LEATHER COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
FORREST C. HOLT and VIRGINIA W.
HOLT, his wife, and ZION'S PROPERTIES,
INC., a corporation,
Defendants.

B R I E F OF

Case No.
13922

Case No.
13922

RESPONDENTS HOLT

S T A T E M E N T OF T H E K I N D OF CASE
This matter involves two actions relating to certain property situated in Salt Lake County, Utah, both
of which under the ultimate pleadings resolve themselves into a determination as to whether or not a certain Uniform Real Estate Contract relating to said
property had been legally and properly terminated so
that title to the property should be quieted in the Respondents Forrest C. Holt and Virginia W . Holt, or
whether the Appellant Zion's Properties, Inc. still retains an interest in the said property under and by
virtue ofl said Uniform Real Estate Contractb. I n
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effect, under all the pleadings, cross-claims and counterclaims in both actions, which were consolidated in the
Court below, the matter resolved itself into a quiet title
action, both the Appellant Zion's Properties, Inc. and
Forrest C. Holt and Virginia W. Holt asking that
title be quieted in them respectively. Tandy Leather
Company, a Respondent herein, was interested only
in determining to whom it properly should pay rentals
on part of the property occupied by it.
DISPOSITION IN T H E L O W E R COURT
The lower Court granted the Motion of Respondents Forrest C. Holt and Virginia W . Holt quieting
title in them to the said property, holding that the Uniform Real Estate Contract had been fully and completely terminated, cancelled and forfeited in accordance with the terms thereof, and that the Holts were
entitled to all rentals on the property from and after
February 10, 1974, including monies deposited by
Tandy Leather Company in Civil Case No. 218576
(R. 64-67). From that judgment, Appellant Zion's
Properties, Inc. appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts is not in truth a
statement of "facts" but is a statement of the contentions and interpretations of Appellant. Appellant's
Brief does not cite any page or reference to the record
to support it and accordingly does not comply with
2
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Rule 75 (p) (2) (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondents Holt accordingly set forth the following Statement of Facts.
For brevity herein, the Appellant will be referred
to herein as "Zion's"; Respondents Forrest C. Holt
and Virginia W . Holt will be referred to as "Holts";
and Respondent Tandy Leather Company will be referred to as "Tandy".
The original record sent up from the lower Court
was the file in Civil No. 218576 (the Tandy case) and
reference to matters therein will be designated as "R.
". Since such did not contain all files and pleadings of the consolidated cases the record was supplemeted by transmitting the file in Civil No. 218922 (the
Zion's case) and references to matters therein will be
designated as "Sup. R
".
On January 31, 1973, Forrest C. Holt and Virginia W . Holt, his wife, as seller and the Great Southern, Inc. as buyer, entered into a certain Uniform Real
Estate Contract covering the property which is the
basis of these actions. A copy of said Contract is in
the file (Sup. R. 6-7). Zion's succeeded to the rights
of Great Southern's interest under said Contract by an
assignment dated July 18, 1973. Each and both of the
consolidated actions were precipitated by a notice given
by Gordon C. Holt as agent of the Holts dated February 4, 1974, addressed to Zion's declaring the Con3
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tract to be in default and requiring performance within
five days as required by the Contract. (R. 39 and Sup.
R. 15).
The Uniform Real Estate Contract involved provided for a down payment of $5,000.00 and the balance
of $40,000.00 to be paid, $7,000.00 on or before August
1, 1973 plus interest, and the balance of $33,000.00 to
be paid, $7,750.00 plus interest on or before February
1, 1974 with annual payments thereafter of $7,750.00
plus interest on the 1st day of each February until
paid. (Sup. R. 6). The $5,000.00 down payment was
made but none of the other payments on the Contract
were ever made as and when the same fell due, the only
payments made thereafter being $1,000.00 on or about
August 1, 1973, $5,000.00 on or about September 12,
1973, $500.00 on or about December 7, 1973, and
$1,000.00 on or about December 16, 1973, making a
total of all payments of $12,500.00, and a total of
only $7,500.00 after the initial down payment. See
Answers to Request for Admissions (R. 48) and Answers to Interrogatories (R. 34). Under the terms of
the Contract there should have been paid on or before
August 1, 1973, after the down payment, the sum of
$7,000.00 representing the first installment plus accrued
interest of $1,600.00, or a total of $8,600.00, which demonstrates that never at any time was Zion's current in
its required payments. In addition thereto it was required to pay the property taxes for 1973 in the amount
of $623.27, which it failed to pay and which Holts were
4
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therefore required to and did pay. (R. 36, 43, 44, 45).
With the contract being thus in default as to payments required to be made prior to February 1, 1974,
and the February 1, 1974 payment not having been
made on the date due, the notice of February 4, 1974
(R. 39) was given requiring immediate performance
or forfeiture. No payment was ever made thereafter,
and as shown by Replies to Request for Admissions.
No proper and unconditional tender of any monies was
ever made thereafter. (R. 47-52).
The Contract was then treated by the Holts as forfeited and terminated and the Holts advised all tenants
that rental payments should thereafter be made to them.
(R. 40, 41, 42).
Respondents Holt answered Interrogatories submitted by Zion's (R. 33-38). Respondents Holt then
submitted Requests for Admissions to Zion's on August
7 ,1974. (R. 28). No replies thereto were made or
served or filed within the time required by Rule 36
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and had not been so
served when Holts filed their Motion for Summary
Judgment on September 24, 1974, (R. 22, 23, 24) and
hence were deemed admitted and such was one of the
bases for the Motion for Summary Judgment. Replies
to such Request for Admissions were eventually filed
on October 1, 1974, almost one month delinquent but
were in the files when the Motion for Summary Judg5
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ment was argued. (R. 47-53). Such replies and the admissions therein, even as qualified therein, establish that
the Contract was always in default and that no valid
tender or tenders were ever made prior to the termination of the Contract nor at all. (R. 47-53).
POINT I
T H E L O W E R COURT P R O P E R L Y GRANTE D T H E MOTION OF RESPONDENTS H O L T
FOR SUMMARY J U D G M E N T U N D E R T H E
U N D I S P U T E D M A T E R I A L FACTS A N D ADMISSIONS AS S H O W N BY T H E RECORD
B E F O R E T H E COURT.
Respondents will consider under this heading
arguments and answer to the arguments of the
pellant under its Points I and I I I , inasmuch as
matters are so inter-related that they cannot be
arately discussed without undue overlapping and
lication.

their
Apsuch
sepdup-

I t was admitted that Holts did use a portion of
the property involved for storage of some of Holts'
personal property from the date of the contract, with
the prior approval of the original purchaser, and that
said property was left in said premises until the termination of the contract. (R. 37). This, however, was
not and could not under the law be a justification for
the failure and refusal of the Appellant Zion's to make
6
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the payments required to be made under the terms of
the contract.
As is reflected by the files and records referred
to in the Statement of Facts hereinabove set forth,
from the moment the first payment, subsequent to the
down payment, became due under the contract, the
buyers were in default. The first payment of $7,000.00
plus interest at 8% per annum amounting to $1,600.00
became due under the contract on August 1, 1973. That
payment was not made, but only $1,000.00 was paid on
that date. I t would appear that the balance of the
August 1, 1973 payment was extended to September
1, 1973, but that balance was not paid. (R. 46). The
only payments made subsequent to the initial down
payment were $1,000.00 paid on August 1, 1973,
$5,000.00 on or about September 12, 1973, $500.00 on
or about December 7, 1973, and $1,000.00 on or about
December 16,1973.
Under the Contract after the down payment there
was a balance of $40,000.00 due and payable as set
forth therein. If the payment had been made as required by the Contract on August 1, 1973, both as to
principal and interest, there should have been then remaining $33,000.00 on principal. In fact, however,
after applying payments made to that date there remained unpaid as of August 1, 1973, $40,600.00, and
after the payment of $5,000.00 on September 12, 1973,

7
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there remained due and owing $35,978.96 including interest. (Sup R. 26). Thus the Contract was at that
time delinquent approximately $3,000.00. After applying each and every payment which was made, as the
same were made, as above set forth, the Contract was
at all times in default to and including February 1,
1974, when the next payment of $7,750.00 plus interest became due, which incidentally was not paid.
See Affidavit with calculations attached thereto (Sup.
R. 25, 26) attached to Holts' Motion for Summary
Judgment, (Sup. R. 22) which Affidavit and figures
were never in any respect denied or refuted, but are
in fact completely admitted (a) by the failure of
Zion's to timely reply to Holts' Requests for Admissions, (R. 28-30), and also even by Zion's belated and
delinquent Replies to Requests for Admissions (R. 47,
48). In this state of affairs Holts called into play
Section 16A of the Uniform Real Estate Contract relating to defaults (Sup. R. 7) and gave notice that unless the entire delinquency as referred to above, plus
an amount of $623.27 for 1974 taxes, which Zion's was
required to pay but did not pay, were paid and the
Contract brought current within 5 days of such notice
of February 4, 1974, that the Contract would be terminated and that the seller would refuse to deliver title
under the Contract or to recognize said Contract. (R.
39) The Contract was not so brought current within
said 5 day period nor at all. (See Request for Admissions, R. 28-31, Zion's belated Replies thereto, R. 4752, and Answers to Interrogatories, R. 33-37.)

8
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Appellant has argued in its Brief that its default
was cured by various claimed tenders of payments, and
refers to such claimed tenders in its Statement of Facts
and by reference occasionally in its Argument. Some
of the contentions as relates to such purported tenders
refer to the fact that such tenders were made to one
Sterling Weber, whom Appellant refers to as "Respondents' agent". Mr. Weber was not Respondents'
agent. There is nothing in any record or pleading or
document which was before the Court to indicate that
Weber was Respondents' agent. As a matter of fact
the only thing referring to Weber's relationship to any
party is the statement contained in Appellant's belated
Replies to Holts' Request for Admissions wherein Appellant states "Also, Sterling Weber on behalf of Zion's
Properties, Inc. has requested that such removal occur."
(R. 48).
The record before the Court shows conclusively
that never at any time was there any actual tender made
of any monies to the Respondents Holt, and even if we
accept at full value the contentions of Appellant as
it relates them in its belated Replies to Requests for
Admissions, there never was any unconditional tender
of any funds or amounts whatsoever to any person,
even including the said Sterling Weber, who, as indicated, if he represented anyone, represented the Appellant. Weber's only connection at all with the Respondents Holt was that he was the real estate agent
who intially handled the sale of the property.
9
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Let us then examine the four purported tenders
to which Appellant refers in its Brief and we will see
that if we accept its admissions to Holts' Request for
Admissions at full value (although not filed timely),
the most they show are promises to make a tender, or
conditional tenders, and even then, not timely.
The purported "First Tender" claimed to have
been made is referred to in the belated Replies to Request for Admissions (R. 51). Therein Appellant,
through its officer, states " I made a verbal promise and
tender to pay whatever amount it took to bring all
payments current as of that date in accordance with a
written contract and the verbal and written modifications; I was prepared to write a check out for the
amount from my bank account but did not do so because
the property was not removed." That surely was not an
unconditional tender nor any tender at all, but only a
"promise" to make a tender.
The purported "Second Tender" is likewise referred to in said belated Replies to Request for Admissions (R .51). Appellant states that on or about
February 4, 1974 Richard Brown, for and on behalf
of Appellant, "stated that he wanted to make the payment on the property but wanted Forrest C. Holt to
remove his property from the subject premises". I t is
then stated that Mr. Brown "offered to make payment". There is nothing therein nor anywhere else in
any matter before the Court to show that money of
10
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any kind in the form of cash, check or otherwise was
offered or tendered to the Respondents Holt or anyone on their behalf.
With regard to the purported "Third Tender", this
was allegedly made on or about February 19, 1974 (R.
51). Note that this was long after the Contract had
in fact been fully and completely terminated, so that
such purported tender can have no bearing upon the
matter. Yet even so, it was not a tender. I t is stated
that Mr. Brown, for and on behalf of the Appellant,
displayed to Mr. Weber, who as indicated did not represent Holts, "the stub of a cashier's check made out to
Forrest C. Holt in the amount of $9,765.00" and refers
to Exhibit " B " attached. (R. 52). Note that said Exhibit " B " (R. 56) shows that such cashier's check was
in fact not used and was cashed by the purhaser on
February 22,1974. In any event, there is no contention
that such was ever tendered to Respondents Holt.
As relates to the purported "Fourth Tender", this
allegedly was made on or about March 6, 1974, again
long after the Uniform Real Estate Contract had been
fully and completely terminated and cancelled. The
Appellant Zion's contends that it met again with the
said Sterling G. Weber and "had $10,000.00 in cash
to pay to Mr. Holt, I showed the money to Mr. Weber
and told him that as soon as Mr. Holt had the property
removed I would pay him that cash." Again as relates
to this purported tender, in addition to being well after
11
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the Contract had been terminated, it was completely
conditional and was never made to the Holts or anyone
o their behalf, and in fact was not even made to the
said Sterling Weber, but the only contention being that
cash was showed to the said Weber.
The purported third tender and fourth tender are
obviously those referred to in the Reply to Holts' Request for Admissions No. 2(a) wherein Zion's admits
that they made no payments other than those referred
to in said Request for Admissions. (R. 48). That answer states, "Admitted, except that an additional payment was tendered and refused. That payment was in
the amount of $10,000.00 and was tendered in cash in
the early part of April, 1974 and later in March the
tender was renewed in the form of a cashier's check"
* * * "the tender was conditional upon Forrest Holt's
removing his property and possessions from the warehouse on the subject property". (R. 48) Hence here
again they refer to the tenders as being conditional but
likewise also refer to the fact that said conditional tenders were made after the Contract had been fully and
completely terminated by reason of the default of the
Appellant and purchasers in making payments under
the Contract as and when the same became due.
It will therefore be observed that nowhere in any
record, document or pleading before the Court is there
anything to show that actual money in any form was
ever actually tendered to the Respondents Holt to bring
12
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the Contract current or pay the defaulted amounts due.
The most that is contended is that the Appellant "offered" or "promised" to make a tender under certain
conditions. There is no dispute, and in fact Appellant
emphasizes the fact that whatever purported tenders
were made were conditional upon Holt removing certain
personal property from the premises, but no actual
money ever was tendered to anyone, conditionally or
otherwise, until long after the Contract was terminated.
At that time Appellant claims that in March and April,
one or two months after the Contract was terminated,
it displayed to one Sterling Weber in one instance a
cashier's check and in another instance certain actual
cash and stated that such sum would be tendered in
payment of the delinquency if the property was removed. Obviously no tender made after the Contract
had been terminated has any force or effect whatsover,
even if it were a good tender, and as indicated, Weber
was not Holts' representative or agent.
The fact that Holt had left some of his property
on the premises would not justify in any event Zion's
from keeping these payments on the Contract current.
Zion's had other remedies to which they could resort
if they saw fit. I t could either remove the property or
could put Holt on notice that a specific rental would
be charged to him for the space occupied. Zion's could
not, however, simply elect to make no payments, without being in default and thus bring into effet the default provisions of the Contract, namely Section 16-A
13
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thereof and it surely could not ignore the notice of default without forfeiting its rights under the contract.
This Court has established the rule that a tenant,
and a fortiori a conditional buyer, cannot avoid a forfeiture wherein the tenant or the buyer is in default,
by a claim of an unliquidated or disputed counterclaim.
See King v. Firm, 285 P.2d 1114, 3 Utah 2d 419. The
Court therein quoted with approval from Volume 3,
Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Sec. 887F as follows:
". . . Where rent is due under a lease, the tenant must pay the rent even though he has been
obliged to spend money on repairs which the
landlord has covenanted to make. It is true that
if sued for rent he would in most jurisdictions
now be allowed to recoup or counterclaim the
damages due from the landlord, but the landlord
may not merely sue for the rent. If the lease or
statute, as is usually the case, allows a landlord
to eject a tenant for non-payment of his rent, the
landlord may pursue this remedy, and it cannot
be said that the tenant has paid or tendered the
rent due if he has deducted even a valid crossclaim. So rights may be lost under a conditional
sale or a mortgage by nonpayment though the
creditor owes the debtor on another account a
greater amount than that due him!'
The Utah Supreme Court then stated:
"Thus under some circumstances a tenant
would be required to pay the rent or lose his
rights to the property under the lease although
the landlord owed him more money than the
amount of the rent!'
14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

See also Bennion v. Amos, 28 Utah 2d 216, 500 P.2d
512 (1972) wherein this Court held that affirmative
defenses and the existence of a counter-claim, one of
which was a contention that defendants were deprived
of quiet enjoyment, would not preclude summary judgment or stay or prevent foreclosure of the mortgage
on the property involved.
Again the rule is well established that conditional
tenders are the same as no tender at all. In 52 Am.
Jur., Tender, §24 it is stated:
" I t is the universal rule that a tender upon conditions for which there is no foundation within
the contractual relation between the parties is
ineffective, or as sometimes expressed, a tender
must be without condition to which the creditor
can have a valid objection or which will be prejudiial to his rights."
Also, in addition to the requirement that the tender
must be actually made and must be a good tender, it
must be kept good. See Sieverts v. White, 273 P.2d
974, 2 Utah 2d 351.
I t has long been held by this Court that parties to
a conditional sales contract are bound by the terms
thereof and that full effect will be given to the terms
thereof, including forfeitures, and particularly where
the contract provides that time is of the essence. Among
the cases so holding are the following: Sieverts v.
White, supra.; Christy v. Guild, 121 P.2d 401, 101
15
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Utah 313; Russell v. Harkness, 4 Utah 197, 7 P.865,
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States
in 118 U.S. 663, 7 S. Ct. 51, 30 L.Ed. 285; Hirsch v.
Steele, 10 Utah 18, 36 P.49; Detroit Heating <§ Lighting Co. v. Stevens, 16 Utah 177, 52 P.379; Lippincott
v. Rich, 19 Utah 140, 56 P . 806; Standard Steam Laundry v. Dole, 22 Utah 311, 61 P . 1103; Freed Furniture
$ Carpet Co. v. Sorensen, 28 Utah 419, 79 P.564, 107
Am .St. Rep. 731, 3 Ann. Cas. 634; Truitt v. Patten,
Sheriff (Utah) 287 P . 175.
Where, as here, time is of the essence, not even
equity can relieve the vendee of his default. See Landfield v. Cohen (Calif.) 200 P.2d 149; also Sieverts v.
White and Christy v. Guild, supra.
POINT II
T H E P U R P O R T E D A G R E E M E N T AS REL A T E D TO A P A R T I A L P A Y M E N T N O T E D
ON T H E C H E C K O F D E C E M B E R 10, 1973
H A D NO V A L I D F O R C E OR E F F E C T , A S
T H E SAME, E V E N I F E S T A B L I S H E D , WAS
W I T H O U T CONSIDERATION.
Appellant's Argument No. I I centers around a
puz'ported part performance based upon a purported
agreement or notation referred to on a check dated December 10, 1973. I t is stated that Appellant and Respondents orally agreed to payments of a lesser amount
than that required by the Contract on December 8,
16
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1973, and that in conformance with such purported
agreement the Appellant drew its check on December
10, 1973 in the amount of $500.00. It is stated that
such check bears the notation "As per agreement 12-873". This is one of the payments admittedly made on
the Contract, but made when the Contract was badly
in default and did not in any regard bring it current.
Even if we should assume that on the date mentioned, it was agreed that if Zion's made a payment of
$500.00 that further time would be given in which to
make the additional delinquent payments, such agreement was in no way binding because obviously there
was not any consideration therefor. Zion's was obligated to make all the payments which were due under
the Contract prior to and at that time. By making the
$500.00 payment, Zion's did not agree to and did not
do anything which they were not already bound by the
Uniform Real Estate Contract to do. As a matter of
fact, all they did or agreed to do was less than they
were already required under the Contract to do, and no
additional benefit of any kind was received by Holts
by virtue thereof. Again, it is a uniform rule that there
must be a valid and good consideration for any secondary or substiuted agreement. The rule is well stated
in 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §460 as follows:
u

§460. Consideration for secondary or substituted agreement—necessity.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, a
new agreement by the parties to an older one,
17
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altering, canceling, supplementing, or supplanting their former compact, in order to be valid,
requires some consideration. Where a written
contract is, by a later contract, altered or modified in some of its terms, the later contract must
generally be founded on some valid consideration.
Also, a consideration is generally necessary for
an agreement to discharge a debt or claim for
damages for breach of contract. An agreement
by one person to discharge another from the obligations of a written contract as a matter purely
ex gratia and in the nature of a donation would
be of no binding validity as a mere executory
agreement."

SUMMARY
To briefly summarize, the Appelant Zion's was,
from the moment the first payment became due under
the Contract, delinquent in its payments both of principal, interest, and taxes. No valid tender was ever
made of money in any form to bring the Contract
curret prior to the notice of default and the taking
effect of such notice, thereby terminating the Contract;
furthermore, no valid tender even subsequent to the
termination of the Contract was ever made or presented
to the Respondents Holt. The Contract thereby being
in default and having thereupon been properly terminated and cancelled after proper notice in accordance
with the terms of said Contract, the Motion of Respondents Holt for Summary Judgment was properly
granted by the Court below.
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that there was no basis for
any ruling of the Court other than that which was
made, namely for judgment in favor of the Respondents Holt and that the said Summary Judgment
entered by the Court below was proper and should in
all respects be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
Z A R E. H A Y E S
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents Holt
315 East Second South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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